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Digest: People v. Pitto 
Benjamin Price 
Opinion by Baxter, J., with George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., 
Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J. Dissenting Opinion by Kennard, J. 
Issue 
Is a sentence enhancement pursuant to California Penal Code section 
12022 proper for those who are armed with a firearm in the commission of 
specified offenses, although the defendant's purpose for having the weapon 
was unrelated to the offense? 
Facts 
On May 23, 2003, police officers detained defendant Michael Pitto in 
an area commonly used for methamphetamine sales. 1 The officers, 
searching defendant's van, found a bag containing a small quantity of 
methamphetamine under a floorboard and an unloaded handgun stored in a 
cardboard box behind the driver's seat.2 The prosecution's witnesses 
testified that the gun was likely for purposes of protecting the drugs 
possessed for sale, because the gun was "within arm's reach of defendant" 
and could be quickly loaded.3 Defendant admitted that he intentionally 
placed the drugs and the gun there, but argued that the drugs were for his 
own personal consumption and that he bought the gun because he planned 
to commit suicide.4 
Defendant was convicted of possessing for sale and transporting 
methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code sections 
11377(a) and 11379(a).5 The jury sustained the charges under Penal Code 
section 12022 that he was "armed" with a firearm in the commission of the 
related offenses and therefore subject to a sentence enhancement.6 He was 
sentenced to eighteen years in prison. 7 
The court of appeal found that the trial court's jury instruction 
concerning the meaning of "armed" in Section 12022 failed to adequately 
1 People v. Pitto, 180 P.3d 338, 340 (Cal. 2008). 
2 !d. 
3 !d. at 338, 340. 
4 !d. at 341. 
5 /d. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE§§ 11377(a), 11379(a)). 
6 !d. (citing CAL. PEN. CODE§ 12022(a)( I), (c)). 
7 /d. at 342. 
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explain the link between the firearm and the drug crime.8 The court, 
finding that this instructional error was a constitutional violation not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reversed the conviction to the extent 
that defendant was found to be armed in the commission of the crimesY 
The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal. 10 
Analysis 
The Court observed that, under People v. Bland, Section 12022 does 
not require that the defendant use or even carry a firearm for the sentence 
enhancement to apply. 11 A defendant is "armed" under Section 12022 as 
long as the gun is "available for use, either offensively or defensively." 12 
Bland expressed that, because "the mere presence and potential for use of a 
firearm at a crime scene increases the risk of injury and death," Section 
12022 is meant to "deter and punish persons who create such dangerous 
situations in the course of committing crimes."13 
The Court articulated the principle in Bland that, '"[ w ]hen the 
prosecution has proved a charge of felony drug possession, and the 
evidence at trial shows that a firearm was found in close proximity to the 
illegal drugs in a place frequented by the defendant, a jury may reasonably 
infer (1) that the defendant knew of the firearm's presence, (2) that its 
presence together with the drugs was not accidental or coincidental, and (3) 
that, at some point during the period of illegal drug possession, the 
defendant was present with both the drugs and the firearm and thus that the 
firearm was available for the defendant to put to immediate use to aid in the 
drug possession. "'14 
Applying these principles, the Court said that this was a "classic case 
for finding that the defendant was armed while possessing and transporting 
a controlled substance."15 The Court looked to the proximity of the gun to 
the drugs, defendant's intent of placing them there, and the ease with which 
the gun could be reached and loaded. 16 Thus, the Court said, "a rational 
jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was 
available 'to protect the defendant during a drug sale, to guard against theft 
of the drugs, or to ward off police. "' 17 
Defendant argued that the trial court should have given a special 
instruction allowing the jury to find that there was no "facilitative nexus" 
s !d. 
9 !d. at 342-43. 
10 !d. at 343, 345. 
11 !d. at 343 (citing People v. Bland. 898 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1995)). 
12 !d. (quoting Bland, 898 P.2d 391 ). 
13 !d. 
14 !d. at 238 (quoting Bland, 898 P.2d 391) (internal citations omitted). 
15 !d. at 344. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. (internal citations omitted). 
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between the gun and the drugs because he possessed the gun for a reason 
unrelated to the drug crimes. 18 He argued that, under Bland, a different 
purpose would show that the proximity of the gun was accidental or 
coincidental. 19 The Court rejected this argument because Bland does not 
impose an intent requirement.20 Regardless of his motive, the Court said, 
"the opportunity and incentive to later resort to using the gun in 
perpetrating the crime is the same."21 
Holding 
The Court held that defendant was not entitled to a special jury 
instruction on whether he intended to use the gun for a purpose unrelated to 
drug possession in determining whether he was "armed" with a firearm in 
the commission of the specified drug offenses within the meaning of 
Section 12022.22 
Dissent 
Justice Kennard agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 
trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on Bland's nexus 
requirement.23 He reasoned that Bland interpreted the phrase, "armed ... 
in the commission" of a felony as requiring a "facilitative nexus" or link 
between the firearm and the drug offense. 24 He also said that, under Bland, 
a jury's inference that the firearm's proximity to the drugs was not 
"accidental or coincidental" may be "refuted by defense evidence" to the 
contrary, which he said occurred in this case. 25 He argued that the trial 
court's instruction to the jury precluded it from considering the defense's 
theory that the gun's presence was unrelated to the drugs. 26 
Legal Significance 
This case effectively eradicates the facilitative nexus defense to a 
sentence enhancement under Section 12022 when a defendant knows of the 
nearby presence of a firearm while perpetrating a drug offense. The 
sentence enhancement may be applied regardless of whether the firearm's 
presence near the drugs was for the intended purpose of facilitating the 
offense. Rather, the defendant may be found to be armed in the 
commission of the drug offense as long as he knows of its presence, that its 
presence was not accidental or coincidental, and that the firearm was 
available for use. 
18 !d. 
19 !d. 
20 I d. at 345. 
21 Id. 
22 !d. 
23 !d. at 346. 
24 ld. at 348 (quoting CAL. PEN. CODE§ 12022(a)(l); People v. Bland, 898 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1995)). 
25 Jd. at 349 (quoting Bland, 898 P.2d 391). 
26 Id. at 350. 
